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A propositional temporal logic is brie°y introduced and its use for reactive systems
speciflcation is motivated and illustrated. G-automata are proposed as a new opera-
tional semantics domain designed to cope with fairness/liveness properties. G-automata
are a class of labelled transition systems with an additional structure of goal achieve-
ment which forces the eventual fulfllment of every pending goal. An algorithm is then
presented, that takes a flnite system speciflcation as input and that, by a stepwise
tableaux analysis method, builds up a canonical G-automaton matching the speciflca-
tion. Eventuality formulae correspond to goals of the automaton their satisfaction being
thus assured. The direct execution of G-automata, and consequently of speciflcations,
is then discussed and suggested as an alternative approach to the execution of proposi-
tional temporal logic. A short overview of the advantages of applying the techniques to
the speciflc fleld of database monitoring is presented.
c° 1996 Academic Press Limited
1. Introduction
The use of temporal logic has been widely explored both on the flelds of speciflcation and
certiflcation of properties of reactive systems (.Pnueli, 1977; .Sernadas, 1980; .Fiadeiro and
.Maibaum, .1992; .Clarke et al., 1992; .Manna and Pnueli, 1992, .1993; .Sernadas et al. 1995,
.1996b) and in monitoring (.Hu˜lsmann and Saake, 1991; .Kung, 1984; .Lipeck and Saake,
1987; .Schwiderski et al., 1994). The advantages are known to lie on the clear declarative
formalization of the system at hand and on the use of temporal veriflcation techniques to
prove properties of the specifled systems. Temporal logic speciflcation has also given an
important contribution towards the establishment of suitable compositional speciflcation
frameworks (.Barringer et al., 1984).
We address the subject of connecting temporal speciflcation with an operational se-
mantic domain built around the notion of a labelled transition system. The problem,
identifled in .Sernadas .et al. .(1994) and flrst dealt with in .Caleiro .(1994), lies in establish-
ing the canonical operational semantics of temporal speciflcations, and consequently in
y This work was partly supported by the PRAXIS Project SitCalc, and by CEC under ESPRIT-III
BRA WG 6071 IS-CORE (Information Systems|COrrectness and REusability), WG 6112 COMPASS
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0747{7171/96/110521 + 33 $25.00/0 c° 1996 Academic Press Limited
522 C. Caleiro et al.
flnding a notion of labelled transition system which copes well with liveness and fairness
issues. Moreover, the results obtained in .Sernadas .et al. .(1996a) concerning denotational
semantics also stressed the need to provide an adequate operational counterpart. For
the purpose, and restricting our attention to propositional temporal logic, we present G-
automata, which are labelled transition systems with stuttering, additionally equipped
with a structure of goals whose intention is to restrict acceptance. These are closely re-
lated to assuming fairness assumptions on the execution of transition systems (.Manna
and Pnueli, 1992, .1993) but use an approach somehow similar to the acceptance structure
of other, well-known, deflnitions of automata on inflnite computations such as those of
Bu˜chi, Muller or Streett automata (.Thomas, 1990) or variants of these, e.g. 8-automata
( .Manna and Pnueli, 1987). However, G-automata arise, in our opinion, much more natu-
rally, while still emulating their expressive power. Mainly due to the fact that they explore
transitions rather than states to formulate the acceptance condition on computations,
which seems much more natural since the performance of transitions is the only way a
system may evolve in order to satisfy some commitment. Using such a semantic domain
we manage to flll in the gap between speciflcation and operational semantics. We pro-
vide a constructive method to obtain the operational semantics of a system speciflcation
by means of a tableaux-like method based on the decision procedure for propositional
temporal logic satisflability described in .Ben-Ari .et al. .(1983). The approach is therefore
similar to the \traditional" methods for synthesizing models from temporal speciflcations
( .Clarke and Emerson, 1981; .Manna and Wolper, 1984; .Pnueli and Rosner, 1988). How-
ever, we do not just choose a computation which meets the speciflcation as in .Manna
and .Wolper .(1984) but we manage to build a G-automaton which generates all of its
models. Note that fairness or liveness properties can be specifled, having an operational
counterpart re°ected in the acceptance condition of the obtained automaton.
The direct execution of the speciflcations can therefore be discussed in the context
of possible strategies for implementing G-automata features. We therefore expect to
give a contribution to the fleld of executable temporal logics (.Fisher and .Owens, .1995).
Although the logic we present has some useful speciflc features such as a clear distinction
between state variables, action occurrence and action enabling (.Sernadas .et al., .1995),
our main concern is not to propose a new temporal programming language but rather to
suggest a difierent way of implementing the execution of temporal logic statements based
upon the operational model introduced. We compare this with related work and point
out how the results can be useful, namely in database monitoring applications (.Kung,
.1984; .Lipeck and .Saake, .1987). We end up with an outlook of possible developments of
the proposed techniques.
Through the paper, we assume that the reader is conversant with the fleld of temporal
logic speciflcation, for instance at the level of .Emerson .(1990) and .Goldblatt .(1987), and
with fairness and liveness issues (.Francez, .1986; .Gabbay .et al., .1980).
In Section 2 we introduce and illustrate the use of temporal logic in systems specifl-
cation. The temporal language is deflned and several kinds of speciflable properties are
mentioned. The fundamental aspect of the logic is its ability to distinguish between oc-
currence and enabling of an action. Section 3 is devoted to a full description of the class
of automata we propose. We pay close attention to the structure of pending goals and
corresponding fulfllment associated with each automaton. Parallel composition is studied
as an example of the degree of compositionality obtainable on such a domain. We also
deflne the satisfaction relation between G-automata and the formulae of the adopted
speciflcation logic. The core of the paper is in Section 4. This is where the method of
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synthesis of a G-automaton from a given system speciflcation is described. A tableaux
calculus for the logic at hand is introduced and used as a way of reasoning about \next
state". Section 5 is dedicated to outlining strategies for directly executing speciflcations
via the implementation of the synthesized G-automata. We also compare the techniques
with other existing approaches to executing propositional temporal logic speciflcations.
Finally, Section 6 discusses the results obtained, their connection with previous work and
applications to monitoring. It also outlooks possible extensions to this work.
2. Temporal Speciflcation of Reactive Systems
We consider a reactive system to be some entity able to perform actions sequentially.
Between action occurrences some local state is reached and may be observed by associat-
ing Boolean values to it. One of the most important observable properties of a state is its
action menu, that is those actions whose occurrence is possible. Therefore, as in .Sernadas
.et al. .(1994), we consider a system speciflcation to be a description of its actions and
observations as well as of the enabling conditions of actions and of the efiects of each
occurrence on observations. This corresponds to restricting the possible combinations of
action occurrences and observations allowed by the alphabet.
We start by shortly introducing the envisaged speciflcation logic.
2.1. the specification logic
The speciflcation logic we use, a simplifled version of OSL (Object Speciflcation Logic)
( .Sernadas .et al., .1995), is a propositional multilinear temporal logic. Multilinear in the
exact sense that it distinguishes action occurrence from action enabling (.Sernadas .et al.,
.1996a). So, if a is some action (or prime action, as we shall name it), ra stands for \a
occurs" and ƒa for \a is enabled to occur".
Definition 2.1. (Signature)
A signature is a pair § = (§obs ;§act) of sets, to whose elements we call, respectively,
observation symbols and prime action symbols. 2
Now, we deflne the envisaged temporal language over a given signature. Throughout
the remaining of this subsection, we consider a flxed signature §.
Definition 2.2. (Atoms)
The set of atoms over § is Atom§ = fb : b 2 §obsg[ fra : a 2 §actg[ fƒa : a 2 §actg. 2
Definition 2.3. (Formulae)
The set Form§ of formulae over § is the least set such that:
Atom§ µ Form§;
(:’); (’) ˆ); (X’); (’ U ˆ) 2 Form§ if ’;ˆ 2 Form§. 2
As usual, the temporal language can be extended with some useful abbreviations:
(’ _ ˆ) abv· ((:’)) ˆ);
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(’ ^ ˆ) abv· (:((:’) _ (:ˆ)));
(’, ˆ) abv· ((’) ˆ) ^ (ˆ) ’));
(G’)
abv· (’ U (’ ^ (:’)));
(F’)
abv· (:(G(:’))).
We introduced four temporal operators. The \next" operator (X) refers, as usual, to the
following instant. The \until" operator (U) we adopt is weak and includes the evaluating
point. The derived ones have the usual meanings, namely, \henceforth" for (G) and
\eventually" for (F). Both include the evaluating point.
In order to deflne the satisfaction of formulae we consider life-structures as sets of
linear life-cycles. A life-cycle consists, therefore, of a sequence of sets of atoms, where
every occurring prime action must be enabled. To such sets of atoms we call snapshots.
Consequently, we also require that enabling corresponds to possible execution in an
alternative life-cycle of the life-structure.
Definition 2.4. (Snapshots, life-cycles and life-structures)
A snapshot over § is a set snp µ Atom§ such that if for some a 2 §act , ra 2 snp then
also ƒa 2 snp. We denote by Snp§ the set of all snapshots over §. For each snp 2 Snp§
we denote by snp n r the set snp \ (fb : b 2 §obsg [ fƒa : a 2 §actg).
A life-cycle over § is a map ‚ : N! Snp§. We denote by ⁄§ the set of all life-cycles
over §. For each i 2 N and ‚ 2 ⁄§ we denote by ]‚]i the preflx of length i of the
sequence ‚.
A life-structure over § is a set ⁄ µ ⁄§ such that, for each ‚ 2 ⁄, a 2 §act and i 2 N,
ƒa 2 ‚i iff there exists ‚0 2 ⁄ with ]‚]i = ]‚0]i, and ‚i n r = ‚0i n r such that ra 2 ‚0i. 2
Definition 2.5. (Satisfaction)
Let ‚ be a life-cycle over §. The satisfaction of formulae in Form§ by ‚ at each i 2 N is
inductively deflned as follows:
‚ j=i b iff b 2 ‚i;
‚ j=i ƒa iff ƒa 2 ‚i;
‚ j=i ra iff ra 2 ‚i;
‚ j=i (:’) iff not ‚ j=i ’;
‚ j=i (’) ˆ) iff ‚ j=i ˆ or not ‚ j=i ’;
‚ j=i (X’) iff ‚ j=i+1 ’;
‚ j=i (’ U ˆ) iff either, for some j ‚ i, ‚ j=j ˆ and for all i • k < j, ‚ j=k ’ or for
every j ‚ i, ‚ j=j ’.
We say that ‚ satisfles a formula ’ over §, ‚ j= ’, iff ‚ j=i ’ for every i 2 N. We also
say that ‚ satisfles a set of formulae ' µ Form§, ‚ j= ', iff ‚ j= ’ for every ’ 2 '. And
we extend the deflnition to life-structures. We say a life-structure ⁄ over § satisfles a
formula ’, ⁄ j= ’, iff ‚ j= ’ for each ‚ 2 ⁄. Analogously, ⁄ satisfles a set of formulae ',
⁄ j= ', iff ⁄ j= ’ for each ’ 2 '. 2
Obviously, a life-structure can be seen as a set of life-trees, life-cycles corresponding
to inflnite paths in a tree. Enablings can therefore be derived, at each node of a tree, by
looking for possible occurrences in alternative nodes.
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The temporal logic we use is non-anchored ( .Manna and .Pnueli, .1989) and is not
equipped with a birth atom whose satisfaction is only held at 0. This is because we
are interested in specifying overall properties of systems behaviour with no particular
interest in initial constraints. Note, however, that adding it would bring no relevant
technical problems throughout the remainder of the paper.
Definition 2.6. (Specification and satisfaction)
A speciflcation is a pair spec = (§;¡), where § is a signature and ¡ µ Form§ is a flnite
set of formulae (usually referred to as axioms). A life-structure ⁄ over § satisfles spec,
⁄ j= spec, iff ‚ j= ¡. 2
2.2. specification examples
It must be clear that, due to the deflnition of snapshot, formulae of the form (ra)ƒa)
are always satisfled. It is also intended, as made clear by the deflnition of life-structure,
that the meaning of ƒa is exactly that a can occur (i.e., enabling of a prime action is
an observation whose value at each instant re°ects its possible occurrence immediately
after). We also require that the systems are open towards the environment. By this
we mean that occurrences may be flnitely delayed, in any life-cycle, in order to allow
interleaving with life-cycles of other systems (.Sernadas .et al., .1996a). This shall mean
that, in general, a formula like ra cannot be expected to hold.
We start by taking a brief look at some classes of formulae commonly used in systems
speciflcation ( .Manna and .Pnueli, .1989, .1991).
Example 2.7. (Specifiable properties)
Let ’;ˆ be formulae with no temporal operators and a be a prime action symbol over
the same signature. We note the ability to specify, for instance:
safety: (G’) or simply ’y;
liveness: (’) (Fˆ));
fairness:
justice: ((F(G ƒa))) (G(Fra)));
compassion: ((G(F ƒa))) (G(Fra)));
valuation: (ra) (X’)). 2
Example 2.8. (Activity)
Suppose we wanted to specify an active system in the sense that it should not remain
idle from a certain instant on unless, in fact, it has really no chance of evolving. i.e., we
want to exclude from its allowed life-cycles all those where, from a certain instant on,
nothing occurs despite there being enabled actions recurrently.
Let § be such that §act = fa1; : : : ; akg.
In that case, the corresponding requirement could be specifled by the axiom:
y This simpliflcation is possible because we are in a °oating framework. Note that, by deflnition, a
life-cycle satisfles ’ if and only if it satisfles it at each i 2 N .
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((G(F(ƒa1 _ : : : _ ƒak)))) (G(F(ra1 _ : : : _ rak)))). 2
Example 2.9. (Clock bomb)
Suppose we wanted to specify the behaviour of a clock bomb system. The idea would be
to have some internal clock doing \tic" until, sometime in the future, the bomb explodes.
We could chose the speciflcation to be clock bomb = (§clock bomb;¡clock bomb), with:
§clock bomb;obs = fong;
§clock bomb;act = ftic; bangg;
¡clock bomb consisting of the following 6 axioms:
1 (ƒtic, on)
2 (ƒbang, on)
3 (:(rbang))) ((on, X on)))
4 (rbang) (X(: on)))
5 (:(rbang ^ rtic))
6 (on) (Frbang)).
Axioms 1 and 2 mean, respectively, that tic and bang are enabled iff observation on
is true. The third axiom ensures that the value of observation on can only be changed
after a bang occurrence and axiom 4 requires that on is false after bang occurs. The flfth
axiom prevents tic and bang from occurring simultaneously and the last one requires
that, once turned on, the clock bomb will eventually bang.
Consider the following life-cycles over §clock bomb:
(i) ‚ such that
‚0 = fon; ƒtic; ƒbang;rticg,
‚1 = fon; ƒtic; ƒbang;rbangg,
‚n = ; for every n > 1;
(ii) ‚0 such that
‚0n = fon; ƒtic; ƒbang;rticg for every n < 50,
‚050 = fon; ƒtic; ƒbang;rbangg,
‚0n = ; for every n > 50.
(iii) ‚00 such that
‚00n = fon; ƒtic; ƒbang;rticg for every n 2 N.
Clearly, both ‚ and ‚0 satisfy clock bomb but ‚00 does not satisfy axiom 6. 2
This is clearly a situation in which the liveness property specifled by axiom 6 indicates
that the specifler did not want to commit himself with the precise instant in which bang
will occur. It is therefore making use of the inherent non-determinism on the satisfaction
of eventualities as a form of underspeciflcation. But eventualities are also used for difierent
purposes. Consider, for instance, the following speciflcation.
Example 2.10. (Mutual exclusion)
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Suppose we wanted to specify a protocol for maintaining mutual exclusion for two pro-
cesses in the access to some critical section (CS). Each process cyclicly leaves a non-
critical \idle" state becoming willing to enter the CS. Upon a certain time awaiting it
must eventually enter and then leave the CS, again becoming \idle". The processes
are not allowed to be at the CS at the same time. We could use the speciflcation
mutex = h§mutex;¡mutexi, with:
§mutex;obs = fidle1; idle2; critical1; critical2g;
§mutex;act = fwilling1; willing2; in1; in2; out1; out2g;
¡mutex consisting of the following axioms
1 (idle1) (: critical1))
2 (idle2) (: critical2))
3 (ƒwilling1, idle1)
4 (ƒwilling2, idle2)
5 (ƒin1, ((: idle1) ^ (: critical1)))
6 (ƒin2, ((: idle2) ^ (: critical2)))
7 (ƒout1, critical1)
8 (ƒout2, critical2)
9 (rwilling1) (X((: idle1) ^ (: critical1))))
10 (rwilling2) (X((: idle2) ^ (: critical2))))
11 (rin1) (X critical1))
12 (rin2) (X critical2))
13 (rout1) (X idle1))
14 (rout2) (X idle2))
15 (((:rwilling1) ^ ((:rin1) ^ (:rout1))))
(((X idle1), idle1) ^ ((X critical1), critical1)))
16 (((:rwilling2) ^ ((:rin2) ^ (:rout2))))
(((X idle2), idle2) ^ ((X critical2), critical2)))
17 (rwilling1) (Frout1))
18 (rwilling2) (Frout2))
19 (:(critical1 ^ critical2)).
Axioms 1 to 18 are paired and correspond to each of the processes separately. The flrst
two state that an idle process is not in the CS. Axioms 3 and 4 declare that a process can
become willing to enter the CS iff it is idle, and axioms 5 and 6 that a process can enter
the CS iff it is outside and not idle. The next two axioms say that a process can leave
the CS iff it is in there. Axioms 9 to 14 specify the efiect of action occurrences. Axioms 9
and 10 say that after becoming willing a process is neither idle nor in the CS, axioms 11
and 12 say that after entering a process is in the CS and axioms 13 and 14 ensure that
after leaving the CS a process becomes idle. Axioms 15 and 16 express a frame rule
saying that only actions can change observations. Axioms 17 and 18 express the fairness
requirement for each of the processes: a process which becomes willing to enter the CS
will eventually leave it. Axiom 19 is where the mutual exclusion is specifled. 2
3. Which Operational Semantics?
If we adopted a class of labelled transition systems whose inflnite computations were
extracted by just requiring sequentiality, we would have no way of supporting, for in-
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stance, the satisfaction of fairness properties. One may want to specify systems where,
to some of its actions no fairness is required or required only on certain situations. This
is often achieved by taking a model whose acceptance condition involves some additional
properties on the set of states visited in each computation, e.g. Bu˜chi, Muller or Streett
automata ( .Thomas, .1990). However, for representing reactive systems it is usually more
convenient to force these additional acceptance constraints on the basis of transitions
rather than on states. It is the case of the fair transition systems used in .Manna and
.Pnueli (1992, .1993). For instance, if so specifled, the treatment of fairness allows the
exclusion of computations where a stuttering transition is persistently performed while
other actions are enabled as shown in a previous example. Apart from all this, the opera-
tional domain we are looking for must also be such that the exact behaviour of a specifled
system may be synthesized from the speciflcation and used as a prototype for execution.
We also need a mandatory stuttering transition (for delays) in order to achieve, to a
certain extent, the possibility of composing systems.
3.1. G-automata
The discussion above motivates the description of our operational semantics domain,
chosen in order to provide the ability to cope with the speciflcation of fairness and liveness
properties, and synthesis from a given speciflcation. The structure of G-automata is,
essentially, that of labelled transition systems with stuttering. However, we additionally
incorporate a set of goals to be achieved at each of its states and a goal fulfllment
mechanism to each of its transitions. By a state having a goal to be achieved we intuitively
mean that the acceptable computations (sequences of transitions) from that state on must
be only those which eventually include a transition fulfllling it. That is, we incorporate
the mechanism for satisfying eventualities into the acceptance condition of G-automata.
Definition 3.1. (G-automaton)
A G-automaton is a tuple aut = (§; S;¢; v;G; p; f) consisting of:
(i) a signature § of observation and prime action symbols;
(ii) a set S of states;
(iii) a set ¢ µ S £ 2§act £ S of transitions, such that for each e 2 2§act and s; r 2 S,
hs; e; ri 2 ¢ means that there is a transition labelled by e from state s to state r;
(iv) a state valuation map v : S ! 2§obs , assigning to each state its set of observations;
(v) a set G of goals;
(vi) a pending goals map p : S ! 2G, deflning the set of pending goals at each state;
(vii) a fulfllled goals map f : ¢ ! 2G, mapping each transition onto the set of goals it
fulflls
such that the following conditions hold:
open-nature: hs; ;; si 2 ¢ for each s 2 S;
fulfllment versus pending goals: f(hs; e; ri) µ p(s) for each hs; e; ri 2 ¢;
goal persistence: (p(s) n p(r)) µ f(hs; e; ri) for each hs; e; ri 2 ¢. 2
As must be clear, transitions are labelled by sets of prime action symbols instead of
being labelled with only one prime action symbol. This is due to our interest in having
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a semantic domain which is rich enough to support, for instance, parallel composition
constructs. In that case, if action symbols are meant to synchronize, our choice turns to
be quite natural. Thus, from now on, we shall refer to sets of prime action symbols just
as \actions".
To explain the three conditions imposed on the deflnition of G-automaton we have
to assume a pragmatic point of view. In fact, since we consider an action to be a set
of prime action symbols (meaning that all those prime actions occur from an instant in
time to the following, performing a concurrent step), we have to decide what we mean by
the ; action. We claim that it should be seen as an \invisible" change of state and that it
can play the role of a stuttering transition. This choice is the key to the achievement of
suitable support for hiding and interleaved parallel composition. Besides, the information
introduced by the maps p and f concerning goals should be such that only pending goals
are fulfllled, and that every pending goal must propagate to subsequent states, at least
until some transition indeed fulflls it.
Given a G-automaton, it is possible to infer which transitions leaving a certain state
may help to the eventual achievement of a pending goal. The intuition is that a transition
contributes to the achievement of the goal if it is the flrst transition in a flnite non-cyclic
path of consecutive transitions leading to one which actually fulflls the goal.
In the sequel, each transition – = hs; e; ri of a G-automaton shall also be referred to
by s e! r and we shall assume dom(–) = s, act(–) = e and cod(–) = r.
Definition 3.2. (Contribution to goal achievement)
Let aut = (§; S;¢; v;G; p; f) be a G-automaton. We say that – 2 ¢ contributes to the
achievement of g 2 p(s) iff dom(–) = s and there exists a flnite sequence of transitions
–1; : : : ; –n such that the following conditions are satisfled:
sequentiality: dom(–i+1) = cod(–i) for every i 2 f1; : : : ; n¡ 1g;
initialization: –1 = –;
inner-cycle absence: cod(–i) 6= dom(–) for every i 2 f1; : : : ; n¡ 1g and
i 6= j implies cod(–i) 6= cod(–j) for every i; j 2 f1; : : : ; ng;
achievement: g 2 f(–n).
We denote by Contrib(–) the set of pending goals at dom(–) to whose achievement –
contributes. 2
Example 3.3. (Contribution)
Consider the G-automaton aut0 over signature §0, such that §0obs = fxg and §0act =
fa; bg, represented by the diagram
s r; ;
fag
fbg
and with:
v0(s) = ;, v0(r) = fxg;
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G0 = fg0g;
p0(s) = p0(r) = fg0g;
f 0(r
fbg! s) = fg0g, f 0(s ;! s) = f 0(r ;! r) = f 0(s fag! r) = ;.
For each of the transitions of aut we have:
Contrib(s ;! s) = ; (every sequence ending up in r fbg! s has an inner-cycle);
Contrib(r ;! r) = ; (every sequence ending up in r fbg! s has an inner-cycle);
Contrib(s
fag! r) = fg0g (consider the sequence s fag! r fbg! s);
Contrib(r
fbg! s) = fg0g (consider the sequence r fbg! s). 2
Having deflned G-automata, we now face the problem of deflning suitable relationships
between them. We are looking for an adequate notion of homomorphism between G-
automata, which may be seen as a guarantee for partial simulation and preservation of
the goal achievement structure. The deflnition was motivated by those in .Caleiro (1995),
.Manna and .Pnueli .(1992), .Sernadas .et al. .(1994).
Definition 3.4. (G-automata homomorphism)
Let aut = (§; S;¢; v;G; p; f) and aut0 = (§0; S0;¢0; v0; G0; p0; f 0) be two G-automata. A
homomorphism h : aut! aut0 is a 4-tuple h = (hobs ; hact ; hS ; hG), where hobs : §0obs !
§obs , hact : §0act ! §act , hS : S ! S0 and hG : G0 ! G are set maps such that the
following structure preservation conditions are satisfled:
partial simulation:
hhS(s); h¡1act(e); hS(r)i 2 ¢0 for each hs; e; ri 2 ¢;
observational correspondence:
h¡1obs(v(s)) µ v0(hS(s)) for each s 2 S;
pending goals correspondence:
hG(p0(hS(s))) µ p(s) for each s 2 S;
goal fulfllment correspondence:
hG(f 0(hhS(s); h¡1act(e); hS(r)i)) µ f(hs; e; ri) for each hs; e; ri 2 ¢. 2
Intuitively, the partial simulation condition of an homomorphism can be seen as a way
of representing a behavioural relationship between a system and one of its components.
In fact, if we regard the source of the homomorphism as a whole system and the target
as a component, the condition requires that every transition of the whole system has a
counterpart in terms of a corresponding transition of the component. The same intuition
applies to the observational correspondence condition, since it states that any observation
in a state of the whole system must be supported by the relevant observations in the
corresponding state of the component. The pending goals and goal fulfllment correspon-
dence conditions force pending goals and goal fulfllment performance of a component to
extend to corresponding states and transitions of the whole.
To illustrate some of the potentialities of this semantic domain, we shall take a look
at its ability to support simple parallel composition with preservation of the goal mech-
anisms of the parts involved.
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Definition 3.5. (Parallel composition of G-automata)
The parallel composition aut0 k aut00 of G-automata aut0 = (§0; S0;¢0; v0; G0; p0; f 0) and
aut00 = (§00; S00;¢00; v00; G00; p00; f 00) is (§; S;¢; v;G; p; f), where:
(i) § = (§0obs + §
00
obs ;§
0
act + §
00
act);
(ii) S = S0 £ S00;
(iii) ¢ = fhhs0; s00i; e0 + e00; hr0; r00ii : hs0; e0; r0i 2 ¢0; hs00; e00; r00i 2 ¢00g;
(iv) v(hs0; s00i = v0(s0) + v00(s00) for every s0 2 S0 and s00 2 S00;
(v) p(hs0; s00i = p0(s0) + p00(s00) for every s0 2 S0 and s00 2 S00;
(vi) `(hhs0; s00i; e0 + e00; hr0; r00ii) = f 0(hs0; e0; r0i) + f 00(hs00; e00; r00i) for every (s0; e0; r0) 2
¢0 and (s00; e00; r00) 2 ¢00. 2
Note that + stands for the disjoint union and £ for the cartesian product of sets. More-
over, parallel composition is a product in the corresponding categoryy of G-automata
( .Caleiro, .1995).
Example 3.6. (Parallel composition)
Let aut0 be the automaton of Example 3.3 and aut00 be the G-automaton over signature
§00, such that §00obs = ; and §00act = fcg, represented by
t ;; fcg
and with:
v00(t) = ;; G00 = fg00g; p00(t) = fg00g; f 00(t fcg! t) = fg00g, f 00(t ;! t) = ;.
Then, aut0 k aut00 is the G-automaton over hfxg; fa; b; cgi with shape
s; t r; t;; fcg ;; fcg
fag; fa; cg
fbg; fb; cg
and with:
v(hs; ti) = ;, v(hr; ti) = fxg; G = fg0; g00g; p(hs; ti) = p(hr; ti) = fg0; g00g;
f(hs; ti ;! hs; ti) = f(hr; ti ;! hr; ti) = f(hs; ti fag! hr; ti) = ;,
f(hr; ti fbg! hs; ti) = fg0g,
f(hs; ti fcg! hs; ti) = f(hr; ti fcg! hr; ti) = f(hs; ti fa;cg! hr; ti) = fg00g,
f(hr; ti fb;cg! hs; ti) = fg0; g00g. 2
y Refer to .Ad¶amek .et al. .(1990) for a textbook on category theory.
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Introducing goals into transition systems was brought up as a way of restricting the
usual notion of computation, imposing necessary fulfllment of pending goals at ongoing
states. Due to this fact we shall restrict our attention to goal-consistent G-automata i.e.,
G-automata where every pending goal can be fulfllled.
If ¢ is the set of transitions of a G-automaton and s is one of its states, we denote by
¢(s) the set f– 2 ¢ : dom(–) = sg.
Definition 3.7. (Goal-consistent G-automaton)
We say a G-automaton aut = (§; S;¢; v;G; p; f) is goal-consistent iff:
for every s 2 S and g 2 p(s) there exists – 2 ¢(s) s.t. g 2 Contrib(–). 2
Example 3.8. (Goal consistency)
The G-automaton of Example 3.3 is clearly goal-consistent. It would not be, however, if
we removed from it the transition – = hs; fag; ri. Note that g0 2 p0(s) and – is the only
transition with domain s s.t. g0 2 Contrib(–). 2
The following result shows that goal-consistency is preserved by parallel composition.
Proposition 3.9. (Goal-consistency of parallel composition)
The parallel composition aut0 k aut00 of G-automata is goal-consistent if and only if both
aut0 and aut00 are goal-consistent. 2
3.2. computations and satisfaction
A computation of a G-automaton is, as usual, a sequence of consecutive transitions.
However, it is possible that some of these sequences do not correspond to our intended
idea of goal fulfllment. In that case, we have to fllter the undesired ones by imposing that
pending goals are fulfllled. Let us consider a flxed G-automaton aut = (§; S;¢; v;G; p; f).
Definition 3.10. (Computation)
A computation of aut is a map · : N! ¢ such that:
(i) dom(·i+1) = cod(·i) for every i 2 N;
(ii) for each i 2 N, if g 2 p(dom(·i)) then exists j ‚ i such that g 2 f(·j).
We denote by Compaut the set of all computations of aut. 2
The deflnition of formula satisfaction by a G-automaton is similar to the above deflned
satisfaction by life-cycle. Obviously, a life-cycle can be extracted from each computation
of an automaton. Consequently, a life-structure can be extracted by considering the set
of all life-cycles corresponding to its computations.
Definition 3.11. (Menu of a state)
The menu of state s 2 S is the set Menu(s) = S
–2¢(s)
act(–). 2
Deriving Liveness Goals from Temporal Logic Speciflcations 533
The menu of a state is the set of actions whose occurrence is enabled in that state.
Definition 3.12. (Life-cycle induced by computation)
Let · 2 Compaut. The life-cycle induced by · is the sequence Lfc(·) such that Lfc(·)i =
v(dom(·i)) [ fƒa : a 2 Menu(dom(·i))g [ fra : a 2 act(·i)g for each i 2 N. 2
Example 3.13. (Computations and life-cycles)
Once again considering the G-automaton aut0 of Example 3.3, clearly:
(i) · such that, for each n 2 N,
·n = hs; ;; si, is not a computation of aut0;
(ii) ·0 such that, for each n 2 N,
·02n = hs; fag; ri and ·02n+1 = hr; fbg; si is a computation of aut0
with
Lfc(·0)2n = fƒa;rag and Lfc(·0)2n+1 = fx; ƒb;rbg. 2
Proposition 3.14. (G-automata and life-structures)
The set Lfs(aut) = fLfc(·) : · 2 Compautg is a life-structure. 2
Definition 3.15. (Satisfaction by G-automaton)
We say that aut satisfles ’ 2 Form§, aut j= ’, iff Lfs(aut) j= ’. Analogously, aut
satisfles the set ¡ µ Form§, aut j= ¡, iff aut j= ’ for each ’ 2 ¡, and aut satisfles a
speciflcation spec = (§;¡), aut j= spec, iff aut j= ¡. 2
4. Synthesizing G-automata from Speciflcations
In this section we aim to present an algorithmic construction method for the opera-
tional semantics (suitable goal-consistent G-automaton) of a given speciflcation over a
flnite signature (flnite sets of observation and prime action symbols). By suitable we mean
not only that it must satisfy the speciflcation but also that it must fully represent any
other automaton satisfying the speciflcation. i.e., the synthesized G-automaton must be
in some sense canonical among all those G-automata which satisfy the speciflcation. The
synthesis algorithm presented capitalizes on the results in .Caleiro .(1994) and consists of
an adapted version of the tableaux-based decision procedure for propositional temporal
logic presented in .Ben-Ari .et al. .(1983) and, speciflcally, of the synthesis method proposed
in .Manna and .Wolper .(1984). We start by introducing the envisaged tableaux system
( .Bell and .Machover, .1977) for the temporal logic we are using. Insight was also given by
similar synthesis approaches for computation tree logics and producing tree automata
( .Clarke and .Emerson, .1981; .Pnueli and .Rosner, .1988).
4.1. tableaux for temporal logic
A tableau is a flnite tree whose nodes are labelled by sets of formulae. Given a set
of tree formation (inference) rules we can build a tableau whose root node is any given
flnite set of formulae. The rules we are interested in are similar to those used both in
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.Ben-Ari et al. (1983) and .Manna and .Wolper .(1984) and are based on the flxed point
properties of temporal operators. The idea behind them is to make the suitable require-
ments over the next instant in order to satisfy a formula at the present.
Definition 4.1. (Inference rules schemata, inference rules, premises,
conclusion)
Let ’;ˆ be formulae. The inference rules schemata are:
(:(:’)) (’) ˆ) (:(’) ˆ))
’ (:’) ˆ ’(:ˆ)
(:(X’)) (’ U ˆ) (:(’ U ˆ))
(X(:’)) ˆ ’(X(’ U ˆ))
(:ˆ)
(:’)
(:ˆ)
(X(:(’ U ˆ)))
(::) ()) (:))
(:X)
(U) (:U)
An inference rule is any concrete instance of an inference rule schema. Given an unary
inference rule
µ
fi1
: : :
fin
we say that fi1; : : : ; fin is the premise of the rule and that µ is its conclusion.
Similarly, given a binary inference rule
µ
fi1
: : :
fin
fl1
: : :
flm
fi1; : : : ; fin and fl1; : : : ; flm are the premises of the rule and µ is its conclusion. 2
The above deflned inference rules schemata for the primary propositional logic connec-
tives and temporal operators can be used to derive rules for those other logical connectives
and temporal operators introduced by abbreviation in Subsection 2.1. We get:
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(’ _ ˆ) (’ ^ ˆ) (’, ˆ)
’ ˆ
’
ˆ
’
ˆ
(:’)
(:ˆ)
(:(’ _ ˆ)) (:(’ ^ ˆ)) (:(’, ˆ))
(:’)
(:ˆ) :’ :ˆ
’
(:ˆ)
(:’)
ˆ
(G’) (:(G’))
’
(X(G’)) (:’) (X(:(G’)))
(F’) (:(F’))
’ (X(F’)) (
:’)
(X(:(F’)))
(_)
(^) (,)
(:_) (
:^) (:,)
(G)
(:G)
(F)
(:F)
We can now take a look at how inference rules are used to build tableaux. Let us
flrst introduce some useful notions. A branch of a flnite tree to be any flnite sequence of
nodes “0; : : : ;“n such that “0 is the root of the tree, each “i+1 is a successor of “i,
and “n has no successors. We say “n is the flnal node of the branch. We also deflne a
leaf of a flnite tree to be the flnal node of some of its branches. We say that a branch is
contradictory if its nodes contain some formula ’ and its negation (:’).
Definition 4.2. (Tableaux)
Let ' be a flnite set of formulae over §. The tree with only one node consisting of ' is a
tableau for '. If T is a tableau and the conclusion of an inference rule is in a branch of T
then T 0, the tree which results from adding nodes corresponding to each premise of the
rule as successors of the flnal node of the branch of T considered, is a tableau. We write
T ` T 0. An exhausted tableau for ' is a tableau for ' such that each of its branches is
either contradictory or no further rules can be applied. 2
As a simpliflcation, we assume that no rule is applied twice to the same formula in the
same branch and that no rules are applied to contradictory branches. Note also that, by
deflnition, every tableau is a flnite tree.
Example 4.3. (Tableau)
Recall the clock bomb speciflcation in Example 2.9. A tableau for the set of formulae
¡clock bomb [ fon;rtic; (:rbang)g is:
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(ƒtic, on)1
(ƒbang, on)2
((:rbang)) (on, (X on)))3
(rbang) (X(: on)))4
(:(rbang ^ rtic))5
(on) (Frbang))6
rtic
(:rbang)
on
on
ƒtic
(: on)
(:ƒtic)
(: on)
(:ƒbang)
on
ƒbang £
£ (:(:rbang)) (on, (X on))7
£ on(X on)
(: on)
(:(X on))
(:rbang) (:rtic) £
(: on) (Frbang)8 £
£ rbang (X(Frbang))
£ (:rbang) (X(: on))
(,)1
(,)2
())3
(,)7
(:^)5
())6
(F)8
())4
From each parent node to its sons we mention the rule schemata which is being used and
we number the formula to which it is being applied. The crosses £ denote contradictory
branches. We conclude that the speciflcation axioms plus the formulae on, rtic and
(:rbang) can only hold if in the next instant on and (Frbang) hold. 2
Proposition 4.4. (Soundness)
A life-cycle ‚ over § satisfles at i 2 N the conclusion of an inference rule iff it satisfles
all the formulae in some of its premises. A life-cycle ‚ over signature § satisfles at i 2 N
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all the formulae in the root of a tableau iff it satisfles all the formulae in some of its
branches. 2
As immediate corollaries we have that the root of a tableau is inconsistent (not satis-
flable) if and only if all its branches are inconsistent. In particular, if all its branches are
contradictory then its root is inconsistent.
The following result shows the existence of a procedure tableau which constructs an
exhausted tableau given the set of formulae wanted in its root.
Proposition 4.5. (Existence of tableaux construction procedure)
Let ' be a flnite set of formulae over §. There is no inflnite sequence fTigi2N of tableaux
for ' s.t. Ti ` Ti+1 for every i 2 N. Moreover, the set of tableaux for ' is flnite and each
of them can be efiectively computed. 2
The proof of the result above is straightforward, although dull, and can be done by
induction on the structure of the formulae in '.
We also consider available a procedure branches which takes a tableau as input and
produces the set of sets of formulae corresponding to each of its non-contradictory
branches. From now on we shall call branch to the set of all the formulae which oc-
cur in its nodes.
4.2. the synthesis algorithm
The set of inference rules we use is such that a tableau is a way of requiring (when
necessary) that the \next state" conditions hold. We simply get to know which formulae
must be satisfled in the next instant in order to satisfy the actual set at the present.
This is the overall idea behind the synthesis method. It proceeds by checking which sets
of formulae may characterize a state reachable from some other by the occurrence of
a certain set of prime actions. The procedure shall, however, require that the working
signature is flnite i.e., that both the sets of observation and prime action symbols are
flnite. Let § be such a signature.
We introduce some auxiliary notation:
(i) if B µ §obs , obs(B) = B [ f(: b) : b 2 (§obs nB)g;
(ii) if e 2 2§act , ƒ(e) = fƒa : a 2 eg [ f(:ƒa) : a 2 (§act n e)g;
(iii) if e 2 2§act , r(e) = fra : a 2 eg [ f(:ra) : a 2 (§act n e)g;
(iv) if ' µ Form§, next(') = f’ : (X’) 2 'g;
(v) if ' µ Form§, G(') = f(G’) : ’ 2 'g.
Let us now consider a flxed speciflcation spec = (§;¡) over the flnite signature §.
For the sake of simplicity, we shall preflx the speciflcation formulae with a G operator.
This simplifles the method because we are using a °oating version of temporal logic but a
state by state reasoning. Anyway, it is easy to see that a life-cycle ‚ satisfles a formula ’
iff ‚ satisfles (G’) (remember that the logic is °oating).
The synthesis method consists of flve steps. First, given the input speciflcation, and
by tableau constructions, we build a directed labelled graph with sets of formulae as
nodes and actions as edge labels. We also obtain a candidate valuation map by looking
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at observations in each of the nodes. Step two is a fllter for non-open nodes. Our aim is
to get a G-automaton, thus all the states must satisfy the open-nature condition. The
graph obtained in step one is restricted to those nodes which have an empty-set edge
to themselves. The valuation map is also restricted. The third step, also a flltering step,
deals with our notion of enabling. A node establishes its enablings if for each prime
action whose enabling atom is in the node, there exists an edge leaving it whose label
contains that prime action. We get a yet more restricted graph containing only those
nodes which establish their enablings, and corresponding edges. Once again we conflne
the valuation map to the nodes left. Steps four and flve have to do with goals. In Step four
we build the set of goals and the pending goals and goal fulfllment maps. This is done by
analysis of \eventuality" formulae throughout the obtained graph. In Step flve we check
for goal-consistency of the states of the G-automaton obtained after Step four.
4.2.1. step 1|graph construction
To produce the underlying candidate graph of the claimed G-automaton we proceed
by considering that, at each state, the set of axioms of the speciflcation plus some set
of enablings and observations must hold. Then, by applying a tableau construction to
each such state on considering the execution of each of the allowed sets of prime actions
and by looking at the X formulae appearing in each of its non-contradictory branches we
build up new corresponding states. The set S1 of state candidates is inductively deflned
as follows:
(i) G(¡) [ ƒ(e) [ obs(B) 2 S1 for each e 2 2§act and B µ §obs ;
(ii) next(›) [ ƒ(e) [ obs(B) 2 S1 for each e 2 2§act and B µ §obs , if exist £ 2 S1 and
d µ fa : ƒa 2 £g such that › 2 branches(tableau(£ [ r(d))).
This set S1 is flnite and can, hence, be efiectively computed. This can be proved
by structural induction on the flnite set of formulae of the speciflcation by recalling
that tableaux can be computed, and by using the fact that the possible X formulae in
branches of tableaux and the signature are both flnite. More speciflcally, we can give an
upper bound on the number of states of S1. Just note that its elements can only contain
subformulae of the initial set of preflxed axioms G(¡), observation and enabling atoms,
and negations of those. Hence, since the set of axioms of the speciflcation is flnite, the
number of subformulae of G(¡) is also flnite, say s. Moreover, the set of observation and
enabling atoms has size o+ e = j§obs j+ j§act j. Therefore, there could be no more than
2(s+ o+ e) distinct formulae in each state and thus no more than 4(s+o+e) states.
Each tableau construction then possibly gives rise to new candidate states correspond-
ing to its non-contradictory branches. However, difierent branches may lead to the same
state. We can associate with each \transition" – = h£; d; next(›) [ ƒ(e) [ obs(B)i the
union of all the formulae in all those branches. We call to this set the extension of –. Let
f¡1; : : : ;¡ng = f¡ 2 branches(tableau(£ [ r(d))) : next(¡) = next(›)g. Then:
Ext(–) = ¡1 [ ¢ ¢ ¢ [ ¡n.
The candidate set of transitions is:
¢1 = fh£; d; next(›) [ ƒ(e) [ obs(B)i : e 2 2§act , B µ §obs , d µ fa : ƒa 2 £g,
› 2 branches(tableau(£ [ r(d)))g.
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Obviously S1 and ¢1 give rise to a directed graph Graph1 = (S1;¢1; dom; cod).
We can already deflne the candidate state valuation map v1 by:
v1(£) = §act \£ for each £ 2 S1.
As was pointed out in .Manna and .Wolper .(1984) the construction of this graph consists
of a search for all potential life-cycles satisfying the speciflcation. That is, every life-cycle
satisfying the formulae corresponds to some inflnite path in the graph and every flnite
path in the graph generates a preflx of some life-cycle satisfying the speciflcation.
4.2.2. step 2|open-nature checking
Since we are not interested in obtaining a graph including every possible life-cycle
satisfying the axioms but just those life-cycles corresponding to computations of potential
G-automata we have to get rid of those which do not fulfll the open-nature condition.
Thus, we exclude from the graph all the nodes computed in Section 4.2.1 which do not
have an emptyset labelled transition to themselves.
The set S2 of state candidates for which the open-nature condition holds is:
S2 = f£ 2 S1 : h£; ;;£i 2 ¢1g.
The ¢2 set of transitions is just the according subset of ¢1:
¢2 = f– 2 ¢1 : dom(–); cod(–) 2 S2g.
The restricted graph obtained is Graph2 = (S2;¢2; dom; cod).
Analogously, the v2 state valuation map is the restriction of v1 to S2:
v2(£) = v1(£) for each £ 2 S2.
4.2.3. step 3|enabling checking
We now ensure that enablings in each state agree with the labels of its outgoing edges.
The set T of open state candidates which do not establish their enablings is the least
subset T of S2 satisfying the condition:
if there exist a 2 §act and £ 2 S2 s.t. ƒa 2 £ and fcod(–) : – 2 ¢2, dom(–) = £,
a 2 act(–)g µ T then £ 2 T .
Note that since Graph2 is flnite this set can be efiectively calculated.
We now deflne another approximating graph, Graph3 = (S3;¢3; dom; cod), such that:
(i) S3 = S2nT ;
(ii) ¢3 = f– 2 ¢2 : dom(–), cod(–) 2 S3g;
(iii) v3(£) = v2(£), for each £ 2 S3.
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4.2.4. step 4|goal construction
By now one may wonder if the life-cycles corresponding to \computations" of Graph3
necessarily satisfy the speciflcation. To answer this question we have to take a closer look
at the nature of the formulae inside each state. A priori, the answer should be a–rmative.
That is exactly the intention of the tableaux method. However, a problem arises with a
particular kind of formulae, usually referred to as eventualities. An eventuality formula
is, exactly as its name suggests, a formula whose satisfaction at a certain i 2 N can
be postponed to i + 1. That is, a formula which eventually becomes true, but whose
satisfaction may be attained as late as one wishes. By looking at the rules of our inference
system (or alternatively to the deflnition of formula satisfaction), it is easy to see that
the basic constructors of eventualities are those formulae of the kind (: (’ U ˆ)) which
require the eventual satisfaction of (:’). So, in general, the answer to the question
above is negative. In a state containing eventualities, it is possible that some computation
starting there always performs transitions which delay their satisfaction. We therefore
must get rid of such computations. This is the reason why we enriched the automata
with a goal structure. Eventualities occurring in any of the candidate states give rise to
pending goals which persist until some transition indeed fulflls them. If a state contains
a formula of the referred kind, (:’) shall originate a goal, its fulfllment by transitions
being inferred from the structure of the corresponding tableaux. Due to disjunctions, we
will have to consider each goal to be a set of formulae instead of a plain formula. Note
also that, by abbreviation, the pattern (: (’ U ˆ)) includes the usual \sometime in the
future" formulae, (F °) · (:((: °) U (° ^ (: °))).
Example 4.6. (Satisfaction vs. eventualities)
A speciflcation including (:’) and (F’) is clearly unsatisflable. However, a tableau for
it has non-contradictory leaves, the problem being ever postponed.
(G(:’))1
(G(F’))2
(:’)
(X(G(:’)))
(F’)3
(X(G(F’)))
’ (X(F’))
£
(G)1
(G)2
(F)3
2
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To start with, we shall need a way of taking a closer look at the structure of states.
This can be done by a tableau, which reduces each state to its more atomic constituents.
Since by deflnition of snapshot no prime action can occur without being enabled we just
add the non-occurrence of every prime action which is not enabled at that state.
Definition 4.7. (Properties/consequences)
The set of properties of £ 2 S3 is Prop(£) = £ [ f(:ra) : (:ƒa) 2 £g and its set of
consequences is Conseq(£) = branches(tableau(Prop(£))). 2
We now check for eventuality patterns in the consequences of each state. The unfulfllled
ones shall be called \target" formulae. These will be the building blocks of the goals at
each state. To motivate this, note that several alternative \target" formulae may occur
in distinct branches and thus, recalling the soundness result for tableaux, it is enough to
require the full satisfaction of the \targets" in just one of them. This leads us to requiring
that their disjunction is true.
Definition 4.8. (Targets of a branch)
Let £ 2 S3 and ¡ 2 Conseq(£). We say that a formula (:’) is a target of branch ¡ if
(:’) =2 ¡ but there exists a formula in ¡ with the pattern (:(’Uˆ)). We denote the set
of all target formulae of ¡ by targets(¡). 2
In quite the same way, using the derived temporal operators, we would have a target
formulae ’ for patterns (F’) and a target formula (:’) for patterns (:(G’)).
We now deflne the set Goals(£) of pending goals at each £ 2 S3. For this purpose let:
(i) Targets(£) =
S
¡2Conseq(£)
targets(¡);
(ii) Relevant(£) = f¡ 2 Conseq(£) : targets(¡) 6= ;g;
(iii) Max(£) = f¡ 2 Relevant(£) : f¡0 2 Conseq(£) : targets(¡) ‰ targets(¡0)g = ;g.
Note that we use ‰ to denote strict inclusion.
Definition 4.9. (Pending goals at £)
Let £ 2 S3 and g µ Targets(£). We say that g is a pending goal at £, g 2 Goals(£), iff
(i) g 6= ;;
(ii) g \ targets(¡) 6= ; for every ¡ 2Max(£);
(iii) if ; 6= g0 ‰ g then, for some ¡ 2Max(£), g0 \ targets(¡) = ;. 2
Intuitively, g intersects the targets of all the branches in the consequences of the state,
but none of its subsets does. It is a minimum span of the set of targets with respect to
the alternative maximal branches of Conseq(£).
Easily, one of the sets of relevant targets is accomplished iff all the goals are satisfled.
We can now deflne the set G3 of candidate goals and the pending goals map p3 of the
candidate G-automaton:
(i) G3 =
S
£2S3
Goals(£);
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(ii) p3(£) = Goals(£) for each £ 2 S3.
As far as goal fulfllment is concerned, the obvious idea is that to satisfy a goal it su–ces
the satisfaction of one of its formulae (remember that goals as sets were introduced to
deal with disjunctions). The satisfaction of formulae by a transition will be established
by looking at the corresponding tableau and at the properties of the corresponding state
reached.
Hence, for each transition – 2 ¢3, the goal fulfllment map f is deflned by g 2 f(–) iff
g 2 p(dom(–)) and at least one of the following two conditions holds:
(i) g \ Ext(–) 6= ;;
(ii) branches(tableau(Prop(cod(–)) [ f(:’) : ’ 2 gg)) = ;.
The flrst condition is equivalent to saying that some formula in the goal is satisfled
by performing transition –. The second condition holds if some formula in the goal is a
consequence of the formulae in cod(–) i.e., the reached state. The same is to say that
a transition fulflls a goal whenever some of its formulae is a consequence of the set of
occurring prime actions and of the properties of its domain state or alternatively if some
formula in the goal is a consequence of the properties of its codomain state.
Note that if we enrich the labelled graph structure Graph3 with the set of goals G, the
pending goals map p and the goal fulfllment map f (obtained as described previously)
we obtain a G-automaton.
4.2.5. step 5|goal-consistency checking (minimization)
The problem is now reduced to checking whether or not the obtained G-automaton
is goal-consistent. This can be solved by calculating the reachability graph of each state
with a pending goal and by checking if any of the transitions that fulfll that goal is
reachable. We use the previously deflned notion of contribution.
Definition 4.10. (G-automaton synthesized from specification)
The G-automaton synthesized from spec is syn = (§; S;¢; v;G; p; f) such that:
(i) S = f£ 2 S3 : p3(£) µ S
–2¢(£)
Contrib(–)g;
(ii) ¢ = f– 2 ¢3 : dom(–), cod(–) 2 Sg;
(iii) G =
S
£2S
Goals(£);
(iv) p(£) = p3(£) for each £ 2 S;
(v) f(–) = f3(–) for each – 2 ¢. 2
4.2.6. operational semantics
We are, at this stage, able to deflne our envisaged operational semantics of a temporal
speciflcation as the G-automaton synthesized by performing the steps described above.
And note that the semantics proposed is not only correct with respect to the speciflcation
(in the sense that its induced life-structure satisfles the axioms) but it can also be proved
to be representative, in a rather strong way, of the class of all G-automata satisfying
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the speciflcation. It is canonical in the exact sense that, taking any other G-automaton
satisfying the speciflcation, its induced life-structure is a subset of the life-structure of
its operational semantics.
Proposition 4.11. (Operational semantics)
Let syn be the G-automaton synthesized from a given speciflcation spec = h§;¡i with §
a flnite signature. Then:
(i) syn is goal-consistent and syn j= spec;
(ii) for each G-automaton aut over §, if aut j= spec then Lfs(aut) µ Lfs(syn);
(iii) if syn has an empty set of states then spec is inconsistent.
Proof. We present just an outline of the proof.
(i) By the construction in Step 5 syn is clearly goal-consistent.
Consider now · 2 Compsyn, i 2 N and ’ 2 ¡. It can be shown, by induction on the
structure of ’, that Lfc(·) j=i ’. We sketch the proof just for the base cases and
for eventualities:
’ · b, with b 2 §obs
If for some state £ 2 S it was the case that b =2 S i.e. b =2 v(S) then it would
have to include (: b). Due to Step 1 that state would clearly have been rejected
since it would include a contradiction. Therefore, by deflnition of Lfc(·) it is
clear that b 2 Lfc(·)i and hence Lfc(·) j=i b;
’ · ƒa, with a 2 §act
If for some state £ 2 S it was the case that ƒa =2 S then, necessarily, it
would have to include (:ƒa). The previous argument applies to this case and
hence the state would have been rejected in Step 1. Moreover, since the state
was maintained after Step 3 it establishes its enablings and ƒa in particular.
Therefore we have that a 2 Menu(£). So, by deflnition of Lfc(·) it is clear
that ƒa 2 Lfc(·)i and hence Lfc(·) j=i ƒa;
’ · ra, with a 2 §act
In this case, clearly, S = ; which makes the result trivial. Note that every
state candidate is obviously eliminated in Step 1 because the empty action
contradicts ra;
’ · (: (ˆ U #))
By construction, dom(·i) satisfles (:#) and either (:ˆ) or (X((: (ˆ U #)))).
In the flrst case we are done. In the second case (:ˆ) is a target and gives rise
to goal(s). Hence the acceptance of the computation ensures its fulfllment.
(ii) Let – = hs; e; ri be a transition of aut. In order to prove the desired property
it is enough to guarantee the existence of a transition –0 = hs0; e; r0i of syn for
which vaut(s) = vsyn(s0), vaut(r) = vsyn(r0), Menuaut(s) = Menusyn(s0) and
Menuaut(r) = Menusyn(r0). For the purpose flrst consider the candidate state
£0 = G(¡)[ƒMenuaut(s)[ obs(vaut(s)). If £0 is eliminated in Step 2 then pick £1
such that h£0; ;;£1i is obtained in Step 1 by adding exactly the same observations
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and enablings. Repeatedly proceed in this manner until either some £n is not elim-
inated or every possibility has been rejected (there are flnitely many). Clearly this
last case is not possible. It would mean that the state s of aut was incompatible with
its mandatory stuttering transition. Hence, considering an appropriate branch › of
tableau(£n [r(e)) one gets the desired transition –0 precisely by choosing s0 = £n
and r0 = next(›) [ ƒ(Menuaut(r)) [ obs(vaut(r)).
(iii) This an immediate consequence of the previous item. Clearly, no G-automaton
satisfles the speciflcation, since Lfs(syn) = ;. 2
The proof of the flrst statement of this proposition is a direct consequence of the
tableaux constructions and of the essence behind the goal fulfllment condition in the
acceptance condition of G-automata computations.
The second result can be obtained by inductively observing that it cannot be the case
that any of the relevant states and transitions are thrown away in any of the eliminating
steps of the synthesis algorithm.
Let us just examplify the synthesis method by applying it to two concrete speciflcations.
We start by taking a look at the resulting operational semantics of the clock bomb system
and then proceed to the G-automaton corresponding to the mutual exclusion protocol
(both specifled in Subsection 2.2).
Example 4.12. (Operational semantics of clock bomb)
The G-automaton synthesized from the clock bomb speciflcation in Example 2.9 is rep-
resented by the diagram below. Note that the goal is essential to the achievement of the
liveness requirement expressed by axiom 5.
i o;; fticg ;
fbangg
with:
i = G(¡clock bomb) [ f(Frbang); on; ƒtic; ƒbangg
o = G(¡clock bomb) [ f(: on); (:ƒtic); (:ƒbang)g
v(i) = fong, v(o) = ;
G = ffrbanggg
p(i) = ffrbanggg, p(o) = ;
f(i
fbangg! o) = ffrbanggg, f(i ;! i) = f(i fticg! i) = f(o ;! o) = ;. 2
Example 4.13. (Operational semantics of mutual exclusion protocol)
The G-automaton synthesized from the mutex speciflcation in Example 2.10 is repre-
sented by the diagram
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a
b c
d e
f
g h
1 2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16 17
19
18
21
20
where the stuttering transitions were omitted and the labels on transitions are described
below:
¢ is the set containing the following transitions:
–1 = ha; fwilling1g; bi –2 = ha; fwilling2g; ci
–3 = ha; fwilling1; willing2g; fi –4 = hb; fin1g; di
–5 = hb; fwilling2g; fi –6 = hb; fin1; willing2g; gi
–7 = hc; fin2g; ei –8 = hc; fwilling1g; fi
–9 = hc; fwilling1; in2g; hi –10 = hd; fout1g; ai
–11 = hd; fout1; willing2g; ci –12 = hd; fwilling2g; gi
–13 = he; fout2g; ai –14 = he; fwilling1; out2g; bi
–15 = he; fwilling1g; hi –16 = hf; fin1g; gi
–17 = hf; fin2g; hi –18 = hg; fout1g; ci
–19 = hg; fout1; in2g; ei –20 = hh; fout2g; bi
–21 = hh; fin1; out2g; di hx; ;; xi, for each state x 2 fa; : : : ; hg
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v is such that:
v(a) = fidle1; idle2g v(b) = fidle2g
v(c) = fidle1g v(d) = fcritical1; idle2g
v(e) = fidle1; critical2g v(f) = ;
v(g) = fcritical1g v(h) = fcritical2g
G = fg1; g2g with g1 = frout1g and g2 = frout2g
p is such that:
p(a) = ; p(b) = fg1g
p(c) = fg2g p(d) = fg1g
p(e) = fg2g p(f) = fg1; g2g
p(g) = fg1; g2g p(h) = fg1; g2g
f(–) = ; except for
f(–10) = f(–11) = f(–18) = f(–19) = fg1g
f(–13) = f(–14) = f(–20) = f(–21) = fg2g:
2
5. Executing G-automata
Obviously, any operational model is intended to capture some notion of \computa-
tion". And the conceptual breakthrough from automata to execution is necessarily thin
because of their intrinsic resemblance to a state machine. In fact, a synthesis step such
as ours really corresponds to \building an executable program from a non-executable
speciflcation" ( .Wolper, .1987). Therefore, we now turn our attention to the direct im-
plementation of goal-consistent G-automata. If we manage to implement the acceptance
condition of G-automata, and given that any speciflcation over a flnite signature can be
thought of as being represented by a G-automaton (as shown in the previous section),
any reasonable implementation of the synthesized G-automaton can be seen as a way
of prototyping the specifled system. Furthermore, by choosing such an approach to exe-
cuting temporal logic speciflcations we do not have to assume any, a priori, strategy for
implementing any desired fairness or liveness property. It is the way we choose to imple-
ment the acceptance condition of G-automata that must guarantee that all the specifled
properties are satisfled.
Moreover, since executing a speciflcation is no more than building a model of its axioms
( .Fisher and .Owens, .1995), and due to the correctness of the synthesized G-automaton
with respect to the initial speciflcation, any implementation strategy can be chosen pro-
vided that it is fair enough as to ensure that every pending goal at a certain step of the
execution of a G-automaton is indeed fulfllled in some future time. Every possible life-
cycle satisfying the given speciflcation is represented in its synthesized G-automaton and
therefore any of them may be the one resulting from execution, depending on the way
the goal fulfllling strategy and also the inherent non-determinism of G-automata are im-
plemented. This is the main difierence with the respect, for instance, to the \declarative
past, imperative future" paradigm of executing temporal logic speciflcations (.Fisher and
Deriving Liveness Goals from Temporal Logic Speciflcations 547
.Owens, .1992). In fact, the strategy followed by its application to MetateM (.Barringer
.et al., .1989) can clearly be seen as the search for a path in its corresponding automa-
ton. But, without knowing its complete structure, and even possibly having to unwind
previous choices.
This happens because by executing G-automata we are no longer concerned with con-
sistency. The only remaining problem is the correct scheduling of goal fulfllment. The
unpleasant situation when there is no model for the speciflcation is immediately thrown
away by the synthesis method. And there is also no way an intermediate decision during
the execution step may lead to a dead end. All of these are clearly excluded from execut-
ing goal-consistent G-automata. Even if a performed transition did not help fulfllling a
goal, we do always have a way of reaching its fulfllment by continuing its execution from
the reached state. This avoids the use of backtracking strategies which is very convenient
in the case of an interactive prototyping environment as suggested in .Fisher and .Owens
.(1992).
This main advantage is a direct consequence of a compiling instead of interpreting
approach to programming languages. Consistency errors can be found at compilation
time. However, interpreting an inconsistent theory may lead to unexpected run time
errors. The step of synthesis can therefore be seen as a compilation (as opposed to
interpretation as in MetateM). The synthesized G-automaton plays the role of the
abstract machine code generated by the compilation. And note that several runs of
the same system can then be tried without further analysis of the speciflcation since
the G-automaton is synthesized once and for all. Another usual advantage of compiling
resides in the possibility of composing programs. This will be brie°y discussed in the
conclusions, namely with respect to parallel composition.
But compiling also has its disadvantages. Namely because it is clear that interpretation
is much more convenient for incremental speciflcation and debugging.
Now returning to the central problem of implementing G-automata, the \unique" dif-
ference with respect to the implementation of classical automata is clearly the additional
requirement on their acceptance condition. In other terms, we face the problem of choos-
ing a general strategy for implementing eventualities. We may wonder if such a general
method exists. We could simply transmit a report of the current pending goals and the
menu of possible transitions and expect a human to take a wise choice. This would not,
however, guarantee acceptance. On the other hand, it is easy to see that it will suf-
flce to queue pending goals and always choose a transition which may help to fulfll the
oldest goal in the queue. Since the G-automata we are interested in are flnite and goal-
consistent this can be shown to be enough. In what concerns possible non-determinism
we may assume a randomized choice is taken.
We should not, nevertheless, neglect the possibility of prototyping the specifled sys-
tems in an interactive environment. i.e., it would be desirable to allow external signals
on actions to have their counterpart in terms of the strategy for choosing the transition
to be executed. With an approach such as ours, this can be easily done, without further
constraints, by restricting the choice in each step to transitions whose occurrence maxi-
mizes the set of actions signaled by the environment. The choice would therefore be only
among those actions which, besides being chosen in order to contribute to the fulfllment
of the oldest pending goal (if any), ensure the occurrence of the greatest possible number
of signaled actions. By doing so, external signal on actions my have to wait for their
execution.
Obviously, the case when the set of states of the G-automaton is empty need not be
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considered. As far as synthesized automata are concerned, Proposition 4.11 guarantees
that this only happens in case the given speciflcation is inconsistent.
Definition 5.1. (Interactive execution of G-automata)
Let aut = (§; S;¢; v;G; p; f) be a flnite goal-consistent G-automata with S 6= ;. The
strategy for implementing aut is:
1 choose s0 2 S;
2 make i = 0;
3 initialize queue to contain (in some order) the set p(s0);
4 loop
read the current set of external action stimuli to e;
if queue = empty then
{ choose ·i 2 ¢(si) maximizing act(·i) \ e;
{ make si+1 = cod(·i)
else
{ choose ·i 2 ¢(si) with first(queue) 2 Contrib(·i) maximizing act(·i)\ e;
{ make si+1 = cod(·i);
{ remove f(·i) from queue (keeping the order of the remaining goals)
insert p(si+1) n (p(si) n f(·i)) into queue (in some order);
signal the execution of act(·i) \ e;
increment i
end loop. 2
Proposition 5.2. (Correctness of implementation)
Let · : N ! ¢ be the sequence of transitions generated by interactively executing a
flnite goal-consistent G-automaton aut with a non-empty set of states. Then, · is a
computation of aut. 2
The result is immediate since any goal in the head of queue is indeed fulfllled (the
existence of a suitable transition is ensured by the fact that the G-automaton is goal-
consistent and by the inner-cycle absence condition in the deflnition of contribution).
Even in a state with no pending goals the open-nature conditions guarantees the exis-
tence of at least one transition leaving the state. All the rest is a consequence of the
order imposed by the queueing mechanism and is independent of the randomized choice
being used. Furthermore, in each step, the chosen transition executes as much externally
signaled actions as possible.
Note that, in order to execute a speciflcation, the initial state may be chosen according
to a given input set of state constraints (e.g. a condition on the values of observations,
provided it is consistent with the speciflcation).
Proposition 5.3. (Interactive execution of temporal specifications)
Let spec = h§;¡i be a speciflcation over a flnite signature and assume that syn, the
G-automaton synthesized from spec, has a non-empty set of states. Then, · : N ! ¢,
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the sequence of transitions of syn generated by its interactive execution is such that
Lfc(·) satisfles spec. 2
This result is clearly a corollary of both the correctness of the operational semantics
and the previous proposition.
Let us now take a close look at two meaningful examples. Precisely the clock bomb
system and the mutual exclusion protocol previously presented.
Example 5.4. (Executing clock bomb)
Recall the speciflcation of the clock bomb system, Example 2.9, and its operational
semantics, Example 4.12. Clearly, the only interesting initial state choice is i (e.g. by re-
quiring the constraint on). According to the outlined strategy, the unique goal frbangg is
queued. Thus, immediately in the flrst step of the loop, the only possible transition con-
tributing to the fulfllment of the goal is exactly hi; frbangg; oi. So, life-cycle ‚ obtained
from the execution is such that:
‚0 = fon; ƒtic; ƒbang;rbangg,
‚n = ; for every n > 0. 2
The strategy was clearly too strict and the non-determinism on the occurrence of bang
was merely implemented as if it had been specifled (Xrbang). And note that external
signals requiring the occurrence of tic would not help. But, of course, the obtained life-
cycle matches the speciflcation.
Example 5.5. (Executing mutex)
Recall the speciflcation of the mutual exclusion Protocol, Example 2.10, and its opera-
tional semantics, Example 4.13. For the sake of simplicity let us assume that the initial
state choice is a (e.g. by requiring (idle1 ^ idle2)). According to the outlined strategy,
since there are no pending goals, it is possible, for instance, that the stuttering transi-
tion on state a is always performed. Let us suppose, however, that there were always
persistent external stimuli for both willing1 and willing2. In that case, clearly, the flrst
transition chosen leads to state f . Therefore, both g1 and g2 become pending. Without
loss of generality let us assume priority is given to g1. Clearly, the transition contributing
to achieving g1 is –16. We are then at state g and for fulfllling g1 two choices can be
taken. Both moving to states c (by –18) and e (by –19) can be considered. Let us now
suppose –19 is taken. The goal g1 is fulfllled and process 2 imediately enters the CS. The
subsequent step is therefore fulfllling g2 by moving to b by transition –14 hence respond-
ing to the external signal for willing1. After that, again state g is visited and so forth.
In this case, the corresponding life-cycle ‚ is such that:
‚0 = fidle1; idle2; ƒwilling1; ƒwilling2;rwilling1;rwilling2g,
‚1 = fƒin1; ƒin2;rin1g,
‚2+3n = fcritical1; ƒout1; ƒin2;rout1;rin2g,
‚3+3n = fidle1; critical2; ƒwilling1; ƒout2;rwilling1;rout2g,
‚4+3n = fidle2; ƒin1; ƒwilling2;rin1;rwilling2g, for n 2 N. 2
Clearly, the strategy schedules the two processes correctly. The order is maintained,
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always the flrst process is chosen, but only because we assumed that was the non-
deterministic choice.
Note that eventualities may re°ect two kinds of intentions from the specifler viewpoint.
Either guaranteeing response requirements or merely requiring non-determinism on the
moment of fulfllment (implicit versus intended non-determinism). The clock bomb exam-
ple is clearly in the latest case. The eventuality is used as a means of underspeciflcation
since the system specifled is not fully known. And obviously the computation given by
executing it is for sure not the most pleasant. Similar problems arise, however, in other
approaches to executing temporal logic programs ( .Abadi and .Manna, .1989; .Fisher and
Owens, 1992).
6. Conclusion and Outlook
We have shown how to synthesize a representative canonical G-automaton satisfying
a temporal logic speciflcation. Namely, we have managed to derive liveness goals from a
speciflcation, hence being able to go beyond simply dealing with safety properties. Having
obtained a way of associating an operational counterpart, in a suitable domain, to each
system speciflcation, several extensions to this work can now be considered. First of all, a
full study of the compositionality properties of G-automata and of the connection between
these constructs and the speciflcation logic is required. The obvious step should be the
study of the associated institution and its relationship to the corresponding denotational
semantics ( .Sernadas .et al., .1996a). A flrst attempt in this direction can be found in
.Caleiro (1995).
A deeper study of the power and nature of the acceptance condition of G-automata
is necessary. However, we are already able to compare it with the classical Muller au-
tomata on inflnite objects (.Thomas, 1990). Bu˜chi automata are not suitable for our
purposes since their acceptance condition is based on passing inflnitely often in one of a
number of flnal states, which does not flt our need for stuttering (the persistent perfor-
mance of the stuttering transition at an accepting state would be accepted but could, in
general, be unaware of goal fulfllment). With respect to Muller automata we can say that
G-automata are not less powerful i.e., that a G-automaton can be build out of a Muller
automaton both accepting exactly the same computations. Muller automata acceptance
condition is that the set of states visited inflnitely often is one of a number of sets of
states (called frequent sets). This is done by replication of the original state/transition
structure through each frequent set and introduction of a persistent goal, in each of the
replications, corresponding to each of its states, whose fulfllment is attained exactly by
the transitions reaching that state. The acceptance condition of G-automata seems, how-
ever, more intuitive since it has to do with transitions rather than with states. At each
step, each transition performed may be \helping" the computation to be accepted. This
seems much more natural and feasible than being sure that in the end an exact set of
states was visited inflnitely often.
It is clear that the G-automata framework is suitable as a means of implementing
prototypes of temporal systems speciflcations. However, the di–culties remain on the
goal structure of the automaton. Several possibilities can be considered concerning the
way eventualities are fulfllled. The study and implementation of the strategy proposed
and others are a further possible extension of the present work. An interesting line of
research would be considering some kind of probabilistic automata (.Pnueli, 1983; .Segala,
1995). By doing that we also make possible a probabilistic study of the correctness of
Deriving Liveness Goals from Temporal Logic Speciflcations 551
implementation strategies and open the door to the use of probabilistic temporal logic
( .Hart and .Sharir, .1984).
Another important subject is the study of compositionality results. The fact that a
system speciflcation can be compiled into a G-automaton may be very interestingly used
together with, for instance, a parallel composition primitive in order to implement inter-
connections of concurrent systems. The framework can therefore be rather compositional
and therefore used for prototyping concurrent systems (.Fisher and .Barringer, .1991; .Merz,
1992; .Fisher and .Wooldridge, .1993).
A severe drawback is that the ideas presented cannot be fully applied to flrst-order
temporal logic (since it is incomplete). But, as pointed out by several authors, proposi-
tional temporal logic is enough in many concrete applications ( .Manna and .Wolper, .1984;
.Emerson, .1990).
A direct application of the presented techniques is their use for monitoring systems
with respect to a given temporal speciflcation. Monitoring of temporal logic constraints
is a way to ensure dynamic integrity for example in the database area (.Chomicki, 1992;
.Kung, 1984; .Lipeck, 1990; .Lipeck .et al., .1994; .Lipeck and .Saake, .1987) or in object sys-
tems ( .Schwiderski .et al. .1994). In .Hu˜lsmann and .Saake .(1991); .Lipeck and .Saake .(1987);
.Saake .S(1991); .Schwiderski .et al. .(1994) a special kind of automaton, called transition
graph, is constructed from temporal logic constraints to be used for monitoring dynamic
integrity in databases. Compared to G-automata, transition graphs take no advantage of
such explicit goals only distinguishing the situations \no pending goals", \pending goals
which are satisflable" and \inconsistent set of pending goals". Furthermore, satisfaction
of the speciflcation can only be deflned for flnite system runs. Compared to this work,
G-automata enable a difierentiated measure of the satisfaction of a temporal speciflca-
tion because the goals are made explicit. We can, for instance, use a preference relation
between goal sets to distinguish system states which are \better" in satisfying a certain
speciflcation than others. During runtime, the process of system monitoring enables de-
cisions about plans for satisfying more goals depending on the current state. This also
allows for coordination of systems behaviour based on a temporal speciflcation without
having to generate the complete system from scratch.
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